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Beyond Rationality: A Sociological
Construction of the World Trade Organization
SUNGJOON CHO *

This Article critiques the rational-institutional analysis of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) that Gregory Shaffer and Joel Trachtman present, and
proposes an alternative “sociological” framework. The Article notes that
rationalism, although a powerful heuristic of the WTO’s operation, inevitably
overlooks the WTO’s rich social dimensions and thus leaves behind several
theoretical blind spots, such as the lack of any satisfying explanation on
institutional evolution and development concerns. In an attempt to address these
blind spots, the Article offers a sociological-communitarian paradigm that
emphasizes cognitive elements, such as ideas, norms, and discourse, to explain
the social dynamic within the WTO. Under this new framework, an
institutional ontology of the WTO is defined not as a contract (Gesellschaft),
but as a community (Gemeinschaft). Within the WTO’s community, its
members convey their thoughts and arguments (ideas) through an iterative and
ritualized process (discourse) and eventually institutionalize those ideas as
norms. The Article also reinterprets rational choice narratives originally
provided by Shaffer and Trachtman in a way so that the rationalistinstitutional analysis converges with the sociological-communitarian paradigm.
The Article concludes that the new paradigm can help WTO members adjust
their ways of thinking and generate new ideas and proposals to address some of
the chronic problems that the WTO confronts.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its highly anticipated launch in 1995, after eight years of
negotiation under the Uruguay Round, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) has been prized as the single most successful example of
international cooperation. 1 Both the size of its membership 2 and its
dispute resolution caseload 3 have continuously increased. Its ever-growing
prominence also commands much academic attention. New journals 4 as
well as academic programs 5 that specialize in the study of the WTO are
frequently commissioned.
A plethora of scholarly projects devoted to the WTO notwithstanding,
relatively few have ever tackled a fundamental inquiry: What constitutes the
WTO, and how should we understand it? 6 Beneath this seemingly polemical
1. Gideon Rachman, A Bad Year for Diplomats, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 2008, at 73.
2. The WTO’s predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was
established with only twenty-three contracting parties; the number of participatory parties rose to 128
when the WTO was created. Currently, the WTO has a total of 153 members. Members and Observers,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, (Sept. 29, 2011, 9:46 AM), http://tinyurl.com/2vons.
3. As of September 20, 2011, a total of 427 disputes have been filed with the WTO. Dispute
Settlement: The Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, (Sept. 29, 2011, 9:47 AM),
http://tinyurl.com/3obqu.
4. See,
e.g.,
JOURNAL
OF
INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC
LAW,
available
at
http://tinyurl.com/4xbd4b4; WORLD TRADE REVIEW, available at http://tinyurl.com/3q5vn9e. The
journals were launched in 1998 and 2002, respectively, and mainly publish scholarly literature
discussing WTO issues.
5. See, e.g., The Academy of International Trade and Investment Law 2011, INST. OF EUROPEAN
STUDIES OF MACAO (June 8, 2011, 10:39 AM), http://tinyurl.com/3ele4up (announcing launch of
academic program).
6. As to the few scholars who have considered this question, see Deborah Z. Cass, The
‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional
Development in International Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39 (2001); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits:
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question lurks a fundamental paradigmatic concern. That is, any answer to
this inquiry will always rely on a certain framework (methodology) or a set
of assumptions; the basis on which inquirers structure their perceptions of
the WTO necessarily depend on their initial paradigmatic views. 7
In their seminal article, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO,
Gregory Shaffer and Joel Trachtman attempt to understand the WTO
largely under a rationalist (or law and economics) framework. 8 In
particular, they draw on the comparative institutional analysis, 9 which
focuses on the availability of alternative choices in understanding the
development of a particular institution. At broad brush, the comparative
institutional analysis is derived from the tradition of “new institutional
economics,” espoused by Douglas North and Oliver Williamson, whose
central theme is that all institutions are invariably accompanied by
transaction costs and therefore can be replaced by alternatives. 10
According to this approach, the WTO’s operation depends on its
members’ participation in its various institutions, which is in turn
determined by the costs and benefits of such participation.
Shaffer and Trachtman view the WTO as a welfare-maximizing
contract 11 in which various institutional choices are reduced to individual
preferences and economic welfare considerations. 12 The rationalist
The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647 (2006); Andrew
T. F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study
of the International Trade Regime, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 81 (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the
WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623 (2006).
7. Brian C. Rathbun, Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial
Concept in International Relations Theory, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 533, 536, 549 (2007).
8. Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO, 52 VA. J.
INT’L L. 103, 105 (2011).
9. Regarding the comparative institutional analysis generally, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES (1994) (describing which institutions — markets, legislatures, or courts — can best
implement social policy goals); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS (2001) (arguing that the
interactions between law-making institutions molds the supply of and demand for law). See also
Daniel H. Cole, Taking Coase Seriously: Neil Komesar on Law’s Limits, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 261
(2004) (reviewing NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS (2001)); David A. Luigs, Imperfect Alternatives:
Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1559 (1995) (reviewing NEIL
K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994)).
10. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 107–08; see generally DOUGLAS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (James Alt & Douglas
North eds., 1990) (defining “institutions” broadly); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) (using the “transaction cost” approach in analyzing
institutions). Thus, the authors’ focus on institutional “alternatives” is derived from both the
institutional economics approach and the “comparative institutional analysis” touted by Neil
Komesar. See generally KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 9; KOMESAR, LAW’S
LIMITS, supra note 9.
11. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 111.
12. Id. at 105–07. In their article, Shaffer and Trachtman define an institutional choice as an
option within a payoff matrix that is calculated according to a form of welfare (cost-benefit) analysis.
Id.
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assumptions in Shaffer and Trachtman’s argument, which characterize a
state’s action as a calculated decision, 13 support a “functional” paradigm.
The WTO, as a corporate collectivity, is regarded as an instrument
designed to achieve members’ common interests within the meaning of
Talcott Parson’s idea of “goal gratification.” 14 According to this paradigm,
the WTO is a contract (Gesellschaft) in which collective guidelines steer
members’ behaviors in a way that preserves their original contractual
relationship. 15 Similarly, existing WTO norms and other institutional
properties, according to the rationalist/functional paradigm, represent
“structural and constraining features” that program and determine
members’ behaviors. 16
The problem with the rational choice model or rational institutionalism
is that it replaces real actors whose rationality is in fact bounded 17 with
flawlessly rational (hypothetical) actors. 18 As a result, although the
underlying logic of Shaffer and Trachtman’s thesis may appear rational, it
also represents a certain myth in that such logic is constructed within a
narrow set of assumptions and is not axiomatic in and of itself. 19 Given
the reality of trade negotiations, titular institutional choices are hardly
deliberate or even calculating. Theories relying on the power of rational
choice and efficiency do not properly characterize most political bargains
because those bargains are often negotiated on a highly contingent basis
across issue areas, 20 whereas the notion of efficiency is often theorized
13. James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political
Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 736–39 (1984) (characterizing utilitarianism as an ideology interpret
actions as based on calculated decisions).
14. Guy E. Swanson, An Organizational Analysis of Collectivities, 36 AM. SOC. REV. 607, 619–20
(1971).
15. Id. at 620.
16. Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50
INT’L ORG. 325, 326 (1996).
17. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State: Keep the
Bathwater, But Throw out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 315 (2002). The idea of “bounded
rationality” has alternatively been described as “cognitive loafing” or “cognitive illusions.” Id. at 315–
16. According to the bounded rationality argument, public officials may be motivated by objectives
aside from mere reelection (“hacks”). Id. at 311, 322, 336.
18. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 132; see generally BO ROTHSTEIN, SOCIAL TRAPS AND
THE PROBLEM OF TRUST (2005); FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GAMES REAL ACTORS PLAY (1997); Vivien A.
Schmidt, Taking Ideas and Discourses Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the
Fourth “New Institutionalism,” 2 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2009).
19. W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS (2d ed.
1987); Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth,
105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 410–11 (1999). Additionally, the rational choice model (law and economics) is
often criticized for holding unrealistic assumptions as to “perfect foresight and complete information
about the future.” Andrew Keay & Hao Zhang, Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries and a Director’s
Duty to Creditors, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 141, 156 (2008).
20. Robert Howse, Do the World Trade Organization Disciplines on Domestic Subsidies Make Sense?: The
Case for Legalizing Some Subsidies, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 85 (Kyle W. Bagwell et al. eds., 2009).
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around a specific issue. Thus, in a normal political bargaining situation, ex
ante rational choices may be either nonexistent or ambiguous.
Rationalism’s theoretical omission is revealing. It ignores the critical
issue of the social formation of preferences and this phenomenon’s
potential to implement change, because it assumes that actors are rational
and seek to maximize only preprogrammed profits or self-interests.21 A
paradigm premised on rationalism cannot conceive of the idea that WTO
institutions 22 can shape and change what WTO members think of
themselves and the nature of their perceived interests through “frames of
reference” and “normative orientations.”23 Under the rationalist paradigm,
we cannot adequately explain how WTO members build their selfunderstandings (identities), as distilled from their own social practices. 24
This is an unfortunate omission in that it hinders us from understanding
the rich complexity of existing social, in particular “discursive,”
dimensions within the WTO. 25
This paradigmatic deficit of rationalism translates into certain
theoretical blind spots. First, if the WTO is viewed as a functional tool
(contract) for members, then it is assumed that its terms are predetermined
and there exists very little room for institutional change. Change is either
“assumed away” 26 or viewed as a reprogramming of an institution due to
unexpected external shocks. 27 Second, the rationalist fear of inefficient or
excessive delegation to the judiciary is accompanied by an interpretive
obsession with deriving the ordinary meaning of texts arising under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This textualist determinism,
which is characterized by an assumption of preprogrammed institutional
choices, largely overlooks the possibility that WTO norms can endogenously
emerge through the social interactions and discourse amongst actors
within the WTO.
21. K. Thelen & S. Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective, in STRUCTURING
POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 8, 16 (Kathleen Thelen &
Sven Steinmo eds., 1992).
22. It should be noted that sociologists emphasize the “social and cognitive” aspects of
institutions, while rational-choice scholars focus on their “structural and constraining” features.
Finnemore, supra note 16, at 326.
23. THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991); Thomas A. Koelble, The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology, 27
COMP. POL. 231 (1995).
24. Schmidt, supra note 18, at 9.
25. Alexander E. Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations, 41 INT’L ORG. 335,
359 (1987).
26. Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast, Intersections Between Historical and Rational Choice
Institutionalism, in PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS: POINTS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN
HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 7 (Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast
eds., 2005).
27. Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and Innovation
in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 662 (2006).
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Third, Shaffer and Trachtman’s rationalist premise leaves normative
considerations, such as participation, transparency, accountability, and
legitimacy, largely unaddressed. While the authors acknowledge that these
considerations both “will often be valued in themselves” and contribute to
rationalist goals (such as “articulating and furthering other individual
preferences”), they do not elaborate what those “values” are. 28 Fourth, as
Shaffer and Trachtman admit, any international political process is
vulnerable to various “biases” due to the asymmetrical distribution of
power and resources among the WTO members.29 Both in a negotiation
and a litigation setting, powerful and resourceful bureaucrats and interest
groups from developed countries tend to prevail over developing
countries. 30 As a positive approach, which contrasts a normative one,
rationalism suggests no solution to the normative concerns related to this
inability of many developing countries to properly represent their
positions.
The aforementioned paradigmatic limitations endemic to the rationalist
approach expose its “disciplinary isolation” 31 and call for a new
framework. In particular, both international relations scholars and
international lawyers have recently begun to take seriously various social
dimensions, such as the constructive role of ideas and norms, of the
political and legal institutions of an international organization. 32 This
Article argues that a “sociological” (or “constructivist” in international
relations theories) approach to understanding the WTO 33 can remedy
those theoretical blind spots left by the rationalist paradigm. The
sociological approach challenges main rationalist assumptions, such as the
idea of fixed preferences, by emphasizing cognitive elements, such as
ideas, norms, and discourse, in explaining the social dynamic within an
international organization. 34
Under this new framework, an institutional ontology of the WTO is
defined not as a contract (Gesellschaft), but as a community (Gemeinschaft). 35
28. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 109.
29. Id. at 127.
30. Id. at 144; Joseph A. Conti, Learning to Dispute: Repeat Participation, Expertise, and Reputation at the
World Trade Organization, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 625, 626–27 (2010) (observing salient disparities in
the levels of member participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings).
31. Finnemore, supra note 16, at 325.
32. Id.
33. See generally Colin Hay, Constructivist Institutionalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS 56, 64-65 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006) (discussing constructive institutionalism);
John L. Campbell & Ove Pedersen, Introduction, in THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 9–13 (John L. Campbell & Ove Pedersen eds., 2001) (discussing
discursive institutionalism).
34. Vivien A. Schmidt, Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse, 11
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 303, 304 (2008).
35. See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2004) (criticizing a
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Within the WTO community, members convey their thoughts and
arguments (ideas) through an iterative and ritualized process (discourse) 36
and eventually institutionalize those ideas as norms. More specifically,
WTO members understand and react to each other’s behaviors within the
WTO through a process of normative discourse, i.e., by referencing WTO
norms. As a language (a “symbolic mode of communication” 37), WTO
norms form a “duality of praxis” 38 in that they are employed to transmit
ideas while, at the same time, they replicate and naturalize themselves. 39
WTO norms provide WTO members with a “generative grammar” and
“underlying principles of order and meaning” that buttress the WTO’s
operation. 40 Thus, WTO norms play a critical role in socially constructing
the WTO via discourse.
The new paradigm stands in stark contrast to the rationalist paradigm,
which regards institutions as a matter of “choices,” such as “incorporation
of international standards, judicial balancing, delegation to markets,
national deference, and process-based review.”41 Under a communitarian,
sociological framework, however, patterns of normative discourse within
the WTO are influenced by history and are shaped as a result of different
discursive conditions. As such, rather than a product of preset choices, the
WTO community emerges and evolves over time in a less rigid manner. It
is not a set of preprogrammed institutional choices informed by fixed
preferences that define the WTO as it exists today; instead, the WTO is an
evolving entity based on sedimented discourses, such as various
institutional rules and practices (acquis communautaire).
The WTO discourse develops in certain distinctive spheres, such as
during peer review in committees and during the adjudicatory process that
takes place within the WTO dispute resolution mechanism, in which
different social actors communicate via shared WTO norms. 42 These
discursive spheres cultivate different kinds of socially meaningful patterns
contractarian (Gesellschaftian) view on the WTO and offering a sociological (communitarian)
framework instead).
36. Schmidt, supra note 34, at 305; For a discussion regarding how iteration can influence
international policy, see John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 193
(1999).
37. Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an
Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19, 60 n.176 (2000).
38. ROY BHASKAR, THE POSSIBILITY OF NATURALISM 38, 43–44 (3d ed. 1998).
39. David Dessler, What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?, 43 INT’L ORG. 441, 467 (1989)
(observing that “[r]ules are . . . media through which action becomes possible and which action itself
reproduces and transforms”).
40. John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the
Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 380 (1982).
41. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 152.
42. Susan Park, Norm Diffusion within International Organizations: A Case Study of the World Bank, 8 J.
INT’L R. & DEV. 111, 113 (2005).
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of practice, which subsequently generate socially acceptable norms in
various forms, such as committee decisions, recommendations, or panel
reports. Moreover, these institutionalized forms of WTO discourse, i.e.,
committee deliberation and adjudication, help to develop numerous
derivative (secondary) discourses as a result of everyday interactions and
communications among individual economic players, such as
manufacturers, importers, and retailers, as well as other types of
interlocutors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), media
outlets, and members of academia.
The recent transformation of the international trade environment
warrants the adoption of a communitarian paradigm in order to
understand the WTO. The contemporary trade patterns shaped by new
phenomena, such as global supply chains 43 and cross-border mergers and
acquisitions, tend to increasingly defy the reciprocal and mercantilist logic
on which conventional trade negotiations used to be based. This shifting
Zeitgeist in international trade is in fact deeply associated with broader
trends, such as “postnational constellation,” 44 in which states no longer
monopolize international economic relations and various individual
economic players, such as importers and distributors, also take the center
stage. Thus, the existing understanding of international organizations
demands a new dimension that recognizes more of the cognitive and
communicative aspects of international institutions.
A cognitive-communicative reconstruction of the WTO may give rise to
a view of the law that contains “egalitarian content.” 45 As Shaffer and
Trachtman admit, a rationalist perspective of the WTO leaves
developmental concerns, such as the chronic lack of resources in
developing countries, largely unaddressed. 46 Once we characterize the
WTO as a community, any developmental disparity tends to become
increasingly “intolerable” 47 because such disparity generates
communitarian risks that threaten the smooth operation of the WTO. In
order to resolve this issue, the new communitarian paradigm can help
WTO members adjust their way of thinking and generate new ideas and
proposals to address these chronic problems.

43. See Daniel Ikenson, Made on Earth: How Global Economic Integration Renders Trade Policy Obsolete,
TRADE POL’Y ANALYSIS, No. 42, (Cato Inst. Ctr. for Trade Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.), Dec.
2, 2009, at 1 passim (underscoring the recent global sourcing and production trends that tend to make
conventional trade policies outdated). Regarding a theoretical analysis on global supply chains, see
notably RONALD W. JONES, GLOBALIZATION AND THE THEORY OF INPUT TRADE (2000)
(discussing the fragmentation of global production processes).
44. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 172 (Ciaran Cronin trans., Polity Press 2006).
45. Id. at 131.
46. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 127.
47. Amartya Sen, Global Doubts, HARV. MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 68.
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Against this background, this Article critiques the rationalist framework
underlying Shaffer and Trachtman’s institutional analysis of the WTO and,
at the same time, offers an alternative — sociological and
communitarian — framework. 48 The Article unfolds in the following
sequence. Part I recounts Shaffer and Trachtman’s rationalist approach,
which is based on concepts such as contract, choice, and institutions. It
notes that the authors view the WTO as a set of institutional and
interpretive choices that are designed to maximize both economic and
political welfare (efficiency). Part II presents an alternative approach based
on such notions as norms, discourse, and community. First, it highlights
certain theoretical blind spots of rationalism due to its paradigmatic
assumptions. This Part then offers a sociological approach to the WTO in
an attempt to address those blind spots. It illustrates the rich social
dynamics within the WTO community characterized by cognitive
elements, such as norms, ideas and discourse. Concomitantly, it
reinterprets rational choice narratives that the authors originally provided.
The Article concludes that the new paradigm may disabuse the WTO
constituencies of a fatalistic yet erroneous conviction that “legal provisions
can be nothing other than reflections of unstable and shifting interest
constellations among powers,” 49 and help reinstate the “inspirational
notions of virtue and of humans as social beings.” 50
Finally, a word of caution is in order. This Article does not argue that
the new sociological paradigm should supplant the rationalist approach
that Shaffer and Trachtman employ. Nor does it suggest that the blind
spots of the rationalist framework render it obsolete. 51 No paradigm is
perfect. What the Article does attempt to achieve is to contribute to a
more complete understanding of the WTO by providing an alternative
paradigm and narrative. It also identifies a zone of convergence where the
two paradigms may harmonize. In this regard, the general critique in this
Article can also apply to other rationalist literatures to the extent that they

48. Sociological approaches to understanding the WTO are rare. Regarding a notable exception,
see Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Economic Law: Sociological Analysis of the Regulation of
Regional Agreements in the World Trading System, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 277 (2008) (applying a “symbolicinteractionist” approach to the relationship between the WTO and regional trading agreements). In
general, traditional international relations (IR) scholars have only recently begun to break from their
tendency of disciplinary isolation and recognize social aspects of political life (including the role of
norms and culture), which IR-dominated theories, such as realism and liberalism, do not consider.
See, e.g., Finnemore, supra note 16, at 325.
49. HABERMAS, supra note 44, at 167.
50. David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J.
97, 103 (2000).
51. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreement: A Rational Choice Approach, 44
VA. J. INT’L L. 113 (2003).
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view international relations as a collection of contractual arrangements, as
opposed to a community comprised of social interactions. 52

I.

THE ORIGINAL (RATIONAL) FRAMEWORK: INSTITUTIONS,
CHOICES & CONTRACT

In their paper Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO, Gregory
Shaffer and Joel Trachtman aim to “develop a new framework for
understanding the drafting and interpretation” of the WTO by exploring
and analyzing various institutional choices made by WTO members and
the WTO tribunal (panels or the Appellate Body). 53 The authors focus on
two dimensions of institutional choices: temporal and spatial. 54 The
temporal dimension involves institutional choice-making at two different
stages: a “treaty drafting” (ex ante) stage and a “treaty interpretation” (ex
post) stage. Different patterns — and concerns — of institutional choices
arise within each stage. The spatial dimension, meanwhile, refers to a range
of “social decision-making processes” transpiring in different institutional
loci, such as domestic, regional, international, political, administrative,
judicial, and market fields.
It is quite obvious that Shaffer and Trachtman’s overall analysis is based
on the “law and economics” approach, or more broadly, “rationalism.” In
particular, they draw on the comparative institutional analysis approach,
which focuses on the role of the availability of alternatives in
understanding a particular institution. 55 The authors also rely heavily on
the “public choice theory,” which assumes that public officials, such as
judges or WTO panelists, attempt to maximize their self-interests,
including by aggrandizing their political welfare through empire-building. 56
To the extent that these officials are rational actors, “they will always move
in a direction that can be determined by external observation.” 57 Based on
these theoretical grounds, Shaffer and Trachtman view the WTO as a
welfare-maximizing “contract” 58 in which institutional choices are reduced
52. Regarding another piece of literature that is representative of the rationalist framework, see
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 121
(2008) (“Our basic rational choice assumptions imply that states will only enter into agreements when
doing so makes them (or at least, their policy-makers) better off.”). Guzman argues that states
comply with international law to maximize their interests, which are influenced by principles of
reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation. Id. at 33–48, 71.
53. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 105.
54. Id. at 105–06.
55. See id.
56. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 490, 490–91 (1996);
Rubin, supra note 17, at 310–11; Spence & Cross, supra note 50, at 102.
57. Rubin, supra note 17, at 311.
58. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 111.
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to and defined by individual preferences and concerns of economic
welfare. 59 Thus, all institutional choices revolve around the ultimate
rationalist goals of welfare maximizing and transaction-cost minimizing.
The theoretical foundations of the authors’ analyses cause Shaffer and
Trachtman to interpret various aspects of the WTO’s structural design and
operation in a purely rationalist framework. For example, Shaffer and
Trachtman rely on the efficiency concern (the “cost of specification”)
central to the rationalist paradigm to suggest that there is an institutional
choice between rules and standards in the treaty-drafting stage. 60 They
assume that broader standards may be more efficient than specific rules
given the specification cost inherent in drawing narrow rules. 61
Similarly, the authors regard the Appellate Body’s celebrated
interpretation in Shrimp-Turtle 62 of the chapeau (the preambular language)
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX as
a rational interpretive choice. In Shrimp-Turtle, the United States banned
the importation of shrimp harvested by certain developing countries, such
as India, Malaysia, and Indonesia, on the ground that these countries’
harvesting practices also incidentally killed endangered sea turtles. 63 The
United States claimed this trade restriction was justified because it was
designed to protect the environment and thus was an allowed restriction
under the general exception clause of GATT (Article XX(g)). 64
Nonetheless, the Appellate Body found that the U.S. ban failed to comply
with the introductory language of Article XX (the chapeau), which
stipulated that allowed justifications for failure to comply with GATT
should not be abused (i.e., that restrictions should not amount to being
“arbitrary” or “unjustifiable”). 65 The Appellate Body concluded that the
United States’ failure to engage in multilateral negotiations with the
targeted parties, which were available to the United States under
preexisting environmental treaties, such as the Inter-American Convention
for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, violated the chapeau.
According to Shaffer and Trachtman, the Appellate Body’s prescription,
i.e., multilateral negotiations, represents an example where members of the
59. Id. at 111, 116–17.
60. Id. at 112.
61. Id.
62. Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, Appellate Body and Panel Report, as amended, (adopted on Nov. 6, 1998)
[hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle].
63. Id.
64. Id. at 55–56; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, art. XX(g) (“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption”).
65. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 62, at 75; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 64, art.
XX, pmbl.
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WTO made a rationalist interpretive choice by delegating its authority to
strike a balance between free trade and environmental protection to a
subset of WTO members (disputants).66 The authors argue that one can
understand this choice only by recognizing “the competing priorities held
by the affected parties, because this type of decision involves
commensuration between diverse values.” 67 Therefore, their view is that
affected parties in a given dispute can weigh and balance, in an optimal
manner, the free trade value and the environmental protection value
among themselves. Furthermore, arguing from the political efficiency
(public choice) perspective, 68 Shaffer and Trachtman observe that the
Appellate Body’s decision was warranted, as long as it will not generate
negative externalities. 69 That is, the Appellate Body’s decision is politically
expedient and thus desirable, because the issue only concerns a limited
number of affected parties, as long as these members’ multilateral
negotiation does not somehow undermine the economic welfare of
unaffected WTO members.
Not only do the authors rely on the rationalist paradigm to explain
institutional choices made by the WTO as a general body, but they also
employ the public choice theory in conjunction with the rationalist
framework to compare institutional choices against the choices facing
individual WTO members. As discussed above,70 public choice theorists
argue that public officials behave in a rational manner in order to
maximize their own self-interests; the public choice theory assumes that
public officials will only act in ways that will enable them to maintain or
increase their political power. Thus, Shaffer and Trachtman note that
choices made within the WTO can be justified in two different ways: in
pursuit of empire-building (“public choice welfare”) and in pursuit of trade
liberalization (“public interest welfare”). 71
Given the preceding discussion of their thesis, it is clear that Shaffer
and Trachtman are concerned primarily with the concepts of efficiency,
institutional choice, and public welfare. Although the authors’ rationalist
framework considers a particular hypothetical institutional arrangement as
a particular “social decision-making process” or “participation,” 72 it largely
brackets the social dynamics themselves. Thus, despite their claim that
66. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 125–26.
67. Id. at 126.
68. Shaffer and Trachtman argue that political efficiency, which materializes in the form of an
expedited political decision-making process, is the result of the involvement of a limited number of
parties (governments) who are concerned with specific disputes that have only sub-multilateral
impact. Id.
69. Id. at 126.
70. See supra text accompanying note 56.
71. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 108 n.8.
72. Id. at 106.
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they would adopt a “law and society” perspective, the social, or
sociological, aspects of the institutional process (decision-making) are not
fully considered. Instead, an institutional choice amounts to no more than
the selection of an option in a payoff matrix under a cost-benefit analysis
driven by welfare and efficiency concerns. 73
Take the example of the term “participation.” In Shaffer and
Trachtman’s article, it is not used as a sociological concept, but rather as a
rationalist concept. Shaffer and Trachtman argue that the idea of member
participation involves the allocation of authority through the
“incorporation of international standards, judicial balancing, delegation to
markets, national deference, and process-based review,” 74 through various
hypothetical (alternative) institutional arrangements. 75 WTO member
participation is a proxy for understanding how members seek to maximize
the WTO’s welfare,76 because individual preferences can be inferred from
behaviors such as participation. 77 Participation is a “method of gauging
welfare through revealed preferences.” 78 Thus, the authors suggest that
“participation lies at the heart of key economic concepts such as
transaction costs, externalities, and resource allocation efficiency.” 79 As a
result, participation-based criteria can translate eventually into welfarist
terms, rather than into any sociological phenomenon. 80
The authors’ institutional scrutiny delivers a powerful heuristic on the
WTO and its affairs. However, rationalism does not address “accounts
based on post hoc observation of values or ideology.” 81 Of course,
“[l]imiting the number of variables that a theory considers can increase
both its explanatory content and its capacity to concentrate the scholarly
mind.” 82 This explains why the rationalist framework is capable of
generating such a good deal of significant research, such as that of Shaffer
and Trachtman. 83 By restricting the assumptions of the paradigm upon
which it relies, the authors’ analysis, steered by institutional and
interpretive choices, not only delivers convincing narratives on the WTO’s

73. Id.
74. Id. at 152.
75. Id. at 106–07.
76. Id. at 106.
77. Id. at 108.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 107 n.5 (quoting Neil Komesar, The Essence of Economics: Law, Participation and Institutional
Choice (Two Ways), in ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT 165,
170 (Sandra Batie & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2008)).
80. Id. at 106–08.
81. Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379, 392
(1988).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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present operation, but also retains a predictive force on its future
development.

II.
A.

AN ALTERNATIVE (SOCIOLOGICAL) FRAMEWORK: NORMS,
DISCOURSE, & COMMUNITY

Rationalism’s Blind Spots

No paradigm is perfect; it cannot explain or address everything.
Rationalism is not an exception to this principle. Most importantly, it
overlooks (“brackets”) the possibilities of the formation of and change in
preferences, because it assumes that actors are rational and thus seek to
maximize only fixed, preprogrammed profits or self-interests. 84 Thus, it is
beyond rationalism’s theoretical reach to consider that WTO institutions
can conversely construct what WTO members think of themselves and
their perceived interests, through “frame[s] of reference” 85 and “normative
orientations.” 86 This is an unfortunate omission because it disenables us
from discovering the social, in particular “discursive,” dimensions of the
WTO. 87 As a result, under the rationalist paradigm, we cannot adequately
explain how WTO members build self-understandings (identities) that are
distilled from their own social practices (acquis communautaire). This
paradigmatic deficiency translates into several blind spots.
The first blind spot is that Shaffer and Trachtman’s rationalist
methodology is largely silent on the concept of institutional change or
evolution. In their Article, the authors discuss a form of ex ante
institutional programming (specifically, the process of treaty creation) that
is susceptible to a rationalist-positivist model. During this stage, sovereign
states may determine in advance what they desire, based on rationalist
calculations, by inserting favorable clauses within a treaty. Various ex post
institutional arrangements are later constructed as a result of the
interpretation of this treaty. Although Shaffer and Trachtman would argue
that all of these ex post institutional arrangements and adjustments are
rationally predetermined designs, the reality is that they may be more of a
reflection of change that emerges over time within the WTO.
Unfortunately, a rationalist paradigm cannot take these changes into
account, due to its assumption that an institution is defined only by
predetermined preferences based on welfare-maximizing considerations;
an institutional change is either “assumed away” 88 or viewed as a
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Thelen & Steinmo, supra note 21, at 8, 16.
Koelble, supra note 23, at 232.
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 23.
Wendt, supra note 25, at 359.
Katznelson & Weingast, supra note 26, at 7.
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reprogramming of an institution due to unexpected external shocks. 89 In
sum, the rationalist framework envisions very little room for institutional
change.
Second, despite its evident methodological merits, discussed above, 90
rationalism’s conscious limitation on the scope of the study of an
institution has its own weakness. Its analysis requires too many additional
hidden assumptions because it brackets too many operational variables.
Therefore, rationalism unavoidably leaves lingering “uncertainty” behind
its analysis. For example, even if the Appellate Body’s judicial balancing of
certain WTO standards may be justified in rationalist terms, i.e., in
accordance with the “cost of specification,” it is less clear that the
Appellate Body’s balancing would necessarily lead to an efficient
outcome. 91
The limitation on variables is also a problem because it means that a
rationalist hypothesis must rely primarily on special cases. For example,
under a rationalist paradigm, the use of non-WTO norms (such as
international regulatory standards) in a WTO dispute may generate
welfare — both economic and political — efficiency, but only if certain
conditions are met. These conditions include: that non-WTO norms can
properly deliver necessary information; that they are not abused for
protectionist purposes; and that the use of such expertise (or expert
organizations) does not favor any particular members over others. 92 In
sum, in order to maintain its validity, a rationalist proposition necessitates
a number of preconditions to be met; these preconditions, however, tend
to be found predominately in special, not general, cases.
Third, the authors’ rationalist approach to WTO dispute resolution
tends to place too high of a value on textualism and thus undermines
jurisprudential evolution within the WTO. 93 The rationalist concern about
the inefficient or excessive delegation to the judiciary is necessarily
accompanied by an obsession with interpreting texts in their ordinary
meaning in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. The reliance on textualism within the WTO is justified from a
rationalist perspective as a deliberate institutional arrangement between
89. Helfer, supra note 27, at 662.
90. See supra Part I.
91. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 112.
92. Id. at 134–35, 140.
93. See, e.g., Henrik Horn and Joseph H.H. Weiler, European Communities — Trade Description of
Sardines: Textualism and its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2002, at 248, 262 (Henrik Horn and
Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2005). See also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World
Trade Court”: Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J.
WORLD TRADE 605, 617 (2002) (arguing that the Appellate Body relies on strict textual
interpretation in its adjudications so as to avoid criticism that it has modified WTO members’ rights
and obligations in the WTO treaty).
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contracting parties (states) to maximize their joint welfare. It might be seen
as “empowering the choices of WTO members and constraining the
discretion of judges” or “giv[ing] primacy to the political branches that
formulated the treaty, rather than to the judicial process.” 94 Thus, the texts
to be applied by the WTO are thrust upon the institution from the outside
as an outcome of a deliberate, and thus rational, institutional choice.
However, this textualism or theory of judicial restraint, reflecting the fear
of “judicial usurpation,” 95 cannot adequately explain the growth of law
within the WTO. 96 Rationalist determinism, characterized by
preprogrammed institutional choices, is largely oblivious to the possibility
that WTO norms endogenously emerge through a social dynamics
(discourse) in the WTO.
The fourth blind spot that Shaffer and Trachtman’s rationalist premise
creates is that the paradigm leaves “normative” considerations, such as
issues of participation, transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, largely
unaddressed. For example, WTO members may make an explicit rational
institutional choice to defer to a WTO tribunal to construct standards to
be applied in future disputes, rather than nailing down precise texts in
advance as rules. According to the rationalist framework, this delegation of
discretion to future WTO authority is a rational choice to the extent that it
is “justifiable in welfare terms.” 97 At the same time, however, the authors
concede that such an ostensibly rational choice is subject to certain
criticism from a “participatory” perspective, because it creates problems of
judicial activism. 98 While Shaffer and Trachtman simply acknowledge that
normative considerations (i.e., participation, transparency, accountability,
and legitimacy) “will often be valued in themselves” in addition to
contributing to rationalist goals (such as “articulating and furthering other
individual preferences”), they do not articulate what those values are.99
The reason that many of these participatory and procedural values
cannot be fully accounted for in rationalist terms is because they are of a
cognitive-endogenous nature. 100 In other words, these values emerge from
internal social dynamics generated by reflective interactions, such as
94. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 116–17. Similarly, Kal Raustiala observes that the WTO
risks generating “quasi-constitutional” rules (“generativity”) as a result of secretive WTO tribunal
proceedings. Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 415 (2000).
95. Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law, 5
HARV. L. REV. 172, 172 (1892).
96. Id. (observing that the growth of law via judicial legislation is not only “desirable” but also
“necessary”).
97. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 112.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 109.
100. Cf. Finnemore, supra note 16, at 329 (“Organizations exist, proliferate, and have the form
they do not because they are efficient but because they are externally legitimated.”).
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discourse amongst WTO members. There exists an inevitable tension
between the narrowly-bounded version of the rationalist paradigm, which
is premised upon the “logic of interest,” and a broader framework that is
based also on a “logic of appropriateness.” 101 While the former paradigm
concerns material-exogenous parameters, such as interest, power, and
utilities, the latter concerns cognitive-endogenous ones, such as culture,
values, and norms. While the former paradigm views an institution as a
constraining structure, the latter views it as a “construct” of ideas. 102
Interestingly, as discussed above, 103 Shaffer and Trachtman’s
conceptualization of the rationalist framework may be broad enough to
recognize both material-exogenous and cognitive-endogenous concerns;
their argument does theoretically allow for the concepts of “political
welfare” and “political efficiency” to be interpreted in light of participatory
concerns. 104 However, the extension of the logical assumptions of the
rationalist paradigm to cognitive-endogenous ones would require too great
a stretch in its parameters and would expose the paradigm to selfcontradiction. Thus, despite their claims of taking account of normative
considerations, Shaffer and Trachtman present a paradigm that cannot
credibly do so.
Fifth, Shaffer and Trachtman’s rationalist paradigm fails to address the
fact that certain regulatory traditions that implicate human culture or
values defy a rationalist approach in the area of risk regulation. That is, a
rationalist approach to certain issues will not be able to account for the
idea that different societies might be sensitive to different kinds of risks.
Shaffer and Trachtman acknowledge that the rationalist institutional
choice to delegate certain fact-finding authority to experts in WTO
litigation may cause accountability concerns because the reliance on private
individuals in veiled investigations may seem undemocratic. 105 These
concerns also manifest in the well-documented debate over the definition
of “risk” between rationalists and culturalists. 106 Rationalists, such as Cass
101. The “logic of interest” refers to the rationalist notion of evaluating behavior according to
economic and other utilitarian benefits; the “logic of appropriateness,” meanwhile, denotes a
sociological approach of judging behavior according to cultural propriety. JAMES G. MARCH &
JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS
22–25 (1989).
102. Schmidt, supra note 34, at 303 (“[N]orms are dynamic, intersubjective constructs rather than
static structures.”).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
104. For example, the authors recognize that an explicit cost-benefit analysis adopted by the
Appellate Body, even if it may improve economic efficiency, would still be undesirable from the
political welfare perspective, considering the incommensurability among different “values and
concerns.” Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 144 (citing Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems,
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 32 (1998)).
105. Id. at 137.
106. Id.
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Sunstein, tend to construct the concept of risk rather strictly, i.e., as
something objective and calculable. Thus, they view any aversions to risk
as stemming from certain psychological errors (“heuristic biases”) or
unwarranted fears of political pandering (“populism”). 107 In contrast,
culturalists, such as Dan Kahan and James Boyle, believe that such
“technocratic rationality” undermines legitimate debates in national
democracies in that a narrowly-defined value (technology) may usurp
diverse yet rich voices.108 These diverging concepts of risk play a vital role
in allocating regulatory power between the WTO and regulating states.
The Appellate Body in the Hormones case adopts the culturalist view of
risk. This case involved a European import ban on U.S. beef treated with
growth-promotion hormones, which the United States argued was
scientifically justified. Specifically, the Appellate Body ruled that:
[T]he risk that is to be evaluated in a risk assessment under Article
5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating
under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies
as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for
adverse effects on human health in the real world where people live and
work and die. 109
Thus, in Hormones, the Appellate Body rejected the application of a
rational approach by refusing to evaluate two situations that could have
been scientifically compared to each other, i.e., naturally occurring
hormones in food and artificially injected hormones found in food. 110 In
fact, the Appellate Body viewed these two situations as incommensurable,
claiming that there was some “fundamental distinction,” and held that any
attempt to compare them would be absurd. 111
107. MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 103 (2009); CASS
SUNSTEIN, THE LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 25, 126 (2005).
108. POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 107, at 103; James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal
Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 751 (1985); Dan Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy:
A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2006).
109. Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), ¶187, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Hormones]. Regarding this case, see David A. Wirth, European
Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), International Decisions, 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 755, 755 (1998); see also Ilona Cheyne, Risk and Precaution in World Trade Organization Law, 40
J. WORLD TRADE 837, 842 (2006) (highlighting the limited value of risk assessment because of its
accompanying inherent tendency to interpret complex data and competing opinions in a subjective
manner).
110. Hormones, supra note 109, ¶ 246.
111. Id. ¶ 221. However, scientists have observed that taking different pathways in consuming
hormones, i.e., whether eating meat that had hormones that were naturally present or were artificially
injected, does not significantly lead to disparate health impacts, as long as the residual level of these
hormones in the human body remained within the limit set by international standards, such as the
Codex standards. Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
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Unfortunately, despite the fact that the Appellate Body recognized
cultural and sociological concerns, it has also suggested implementing a
form of utilitarian judicial balancing, which could be highly problematic in
the face of diverse values. 112 The Korean Beef case concerned a Korean
regulation (a “dual retail” system) that required a separate retail outlet for
imported beef from that exclusively reserved for indigenous Korean beef
(Hanwoo). Striking down the regulation as unnecessary to prevent
fraudulent practices, the Appellate Body held that:
In sum, determination of whether a measure . . . may nevertheless
be “necessary” within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves
in every case, a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors
which prominently include the contribution made by the
compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at
issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected
by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law
or regulation on imports or exports. 113
A rationalist scholar would argue that this weighing and balancing test
forces the regulating country to pick the most rational option among a set
of policy alternatives available to the country. In fact, although the
Appellate Body in Korean Beef did not conduct an explicit cost-benefit
evaluation, 114 it still second-guessed the domestic government’s regulatory
determinations on critical issues, such as the appropriate level of trade
protection, and thus prioritized one policy goal (i.e., the free movement of
beef) over others (e.g., consumer protection). Specifically, the Appellate
Body concluded that allowing regular policing over the fraudulent labeling
of imported beef as Korean beef would be less trade restrictive, and thus
more rational, than forcing beef retailers to split their retail outlets into one
for foreign beef and the other solely for Korean beef, even though that
would have better protected consumer interests and values. 115
Although the Appellate Body’s holding in Korean Beef may seem to fit
well under a purely rationalist paradigm, the test in Korean Beef in fact
promotes the weighing and balancing of conflicting values, i.e., the free
trade value (the “accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports
(Hormones), ¶ 8.187, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997).
112. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 141–42.
113. Appellate Body Report, Korea — Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef,
¶ 164, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) (adopted Jan. 10, 2001) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Korean Beef].
114. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 142; see also Donald H. Regan, The Meaning of Necessary
in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 WORLD TRADE REV.
347 (2007) (arguing that the WTO Appellate Body has not actually engaged in any genuine
“balancing” despite its eponymous undertaking).
115. Korean Beef, supra note 113, at ¶ 181.
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or exports”) and the regulatory value (the “importance of the common
interests or values protected by that law or regulation”). 116 However, as
discussed above, the Appellate Body’s earlier position in Hormones rejected
the use of a weighing and balancing test; the Appellate Body found that
there was no useful judicial balancing test to apply because the two
regulatory situations in question were incomparable. 117 In sum, it is hard to
aver that the Appellate Body has adopted the rationalist approach (of
weighing and balancing) in its judicial review on risk regulation because
there are also elements of culturalism within its decisions. If the Appellate
Body has actually embraced the rationalist paradigm and its accompanying
weighing and balancing test, the Appellate Body will invite a great deal of
criticism from domestic regulators, because such judicial balancing
sacrifices regulatory values in favor of efficiency (i.e., free trade).
The final blind spot of the rationalist framework, as the authors admit,
is that it cannot respond to the fact that an international political process is
still vulnerable to various biases due to the asymmetrical distribution of
power and resources among WTO members. 118 Both in a negotiation and
a litigation setting, powerful and resourceful bureaucrats and interest
groups from developed countries tend to prevail over developing
countries. 119 Powerful countries are thus able to externalize their domestic
interests and preferences in the international trade setting. As long as these
domestic, often mercantilist, interests shape states’ actions, the WTO qua
organization might not be able to fulfill its original goals, such as “an
integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system.” 120 For
example, the Doha Development Round is still in disarray after a decade
of negotiations, mainly because its original development dimension has
not materialized amid major trading nations’ obsession with a
reciprocal — “balanced,” to use a euphemistic term — deal. 121
Unfortunately, the rationalist paradigm, with its assumption of
predetermined institutional choices defined only by efficiency concerns,
fails to recognize or suggest a solution for this problem in the WTO.
Granted, Shaffer and Trachtman occasionally admit these rationalist
limitations. Anchored by their reliance on rationalism, however, their
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Richard Warner, Does Incommensurability Matter? Incommensurability and Public Policy, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1287 (1998) (calling to attention occasions in which reasons behind policy choices are
incommensurable).
118. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 127.
119. Id. at 144; see also Conti, supra note 30, at 626–27.
120. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154.
121. Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 573
(2010) (criticizing the United States’s obsession with the titular “balanced” approach to the Doha
Round negotiations).
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sporadic acknowledgement of the paradigmatic dilemma does not invite a
paradigm shift. Even when they attempt to introduce complementary
methodologies, such as the law and society approach, what they mostly
offer are mere glimpses into these frameworks and not a full-scale
adoption of them. Moreover, even these cursory overviews are often
captured by rationalist terms. For example, Shaffer and Trachtman
recognize that WTO members, businesses, civil society, and even
academics compose an “interpretive community.” 122 This is rather
surprising in that this term signifies a nonrationalist tradition; in fact,
competing paradigms, such as constructivism, often employ it instead.
Nonetheless, the authors understand this social dynamic (that of meaninggiving) only as a structure of constraint, rather than as a social construct
itself. As a result, although Shaffer and Trachtman’s framework recognizes
that the existence of the interpretive community constrains the discretion
of the WTO’s tribunal as a rational (political) actor, 123 it fails to understand
that the community to which the WTO tribunal itself belongs constructs
the very interest and the identity of the WTO members by relying on
shared social meanings and norms. 124
Thus, although Shaffer and Trachtman raise the possibility of “social
processes involving interpretive communities,” 125 they nonetheless fail to
articulate what such social processes are made of. They do not articulate
the social possibility that the communitarian solidarity within the WTO,
enabled by “generative grammar” and “underlying principles of order and
meaning,” shapes the contour of GATT/WTO’s institutional
development. 126 They do not view WTO norms as a discursive device
being operated upon under the “shared understandings or behavioral
expectations” of WTO members. 127 Likewise, they do not elaborate upon
the microscopic social dynamics transpiring within the interpretive
communities of the WTO, such as the process of “judicial internalization,”
in which members of these communities as interlocutors or normsponsors actively mobilize international law in domestic litigations in an
attempt to incorporate the former into the latter (i.e., “transnational public

122. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 119.
123. Id. at 120–22.
124. Sungjoon Cho, Reconstructing an International Organization: A Paradigm Shift in the World Trade
Organization
20
(Apr.
26,
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1823564).
125. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 120.
126. Ruggie, supra note 40, at 380.
127. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 37, at 67; see also Finnemore, supra note 16; March & Olsen,
supra note 13; Karol Soltan, A Social Science That Does Not Exist, in REDISCOVERING FULLER 393
(William J. Witteveen & Wibren van der Burg eds., 1999).
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law litigation”). 128 In sum, the authors’ paradigmatic (rationalist) schema
largely brackets social aspects of the WTO operation.

B. New Framework: The Sociology of the WTO
The aforementioned paradigmatic limitations endemic to the rationalist
approach call for a new framework. Although a new paradigm of the
WTO would not entirely supplant the rationalist understanding of the
WTO, it could still remedy some of its theoretical blind spots. In this
regard, this Article proposes a sociological (constructivist) approach to
understanding the WTO, under which we may reconstruct the WTO as a
community (Gemeinschaft).129 Steve Brint conceptualizes a Gemeinschaft as a
group of significant properties that is defined by social relations, rather
than a tangible, material location, such as a town. 130 This is easily translated
to the context of the WTO, because the WTO’s community is based not
on blood or ethnicity, but on certain social bonds or cognitively-shared
grounds. 131
The sociological interpretation of the WTO draws on socio-cognitive
(intersubjective) parameters, such as “dense and demanding social ties”
and “common beliefs in an idea system.” 132 The GATT/WTO’s enduring
operational efficacy for the last six decades can be explained in sociological
terms, in that its members have been able to interact, communicate, and
eventually converge their expectations through a medium of norms, such
as jurisprudence, that are informed by their shared goals, such as free trade
and global market integration. It is WTO norms and social structures that
determine how members perceive their interests and identities within the
context of the WTO’s object and purpose.133 Therefore, under a
sociological approach, WTO membership is not reduced to a mere sum of

128. Harold Koh raises the possibility of incorporation of international law into domestic law by
implicitly interpreting the latter to be consistent with the former or by explicitly allowing and
developing the idea of “transnational public law litigation.” Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2657 (1997).
129. See generally Cho, supra note 35.
130. Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept, 19
SOC. THEORY 1, 3–4 (2001) (reinterpreting Ferdinand Tönnies’ classical concept of gemeinschaft as a
set of human relations against the contemporary background).
131. But cf. Elisabeth Zoller, Institutional Aspects of International Governance, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 121, 123 (1995) (arguing that an international society is not an international community in that the
former lacks the “commonness” located exclusively in national communities).
132. Brint, supra note 130, at 3–4.
133. Contra Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50 WORLD
POL. 324, 325–26 (1998) (identifying a new (constructivist) trend amongst international relations
scholars of studying international organizations with an emphasis on certain cognitive factors, such as
norms, cultures, and identities).
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material rights and obligations; rather, it entitles members to certain
assurances and a sociological sense of belonging.
WTO members understand and reflect on each other’s behaviors
through a shared normative discourse, i.e., by referencing WTO norms.
Offering the “logic of appropriateness” 134 as well as “semantic
regularities”135 to members, WTO norms generate certain “patterns of
practice” as well as “shared understandings or behavioral expectations.” 136
As a result, members are able to build a collective identity (“we” or
community) among themselves. 137 Within the WTO community, members
“work[ ] . . . together creatively to refashion the linguistically structured
symbols of social cohesion which serve as the resources for intersubjective
experience, with the aim of motivating action.” 138
The recent transformation of the international trade environment
further warrants a communitarian paradigm shift in the WTO. Since the
GATT’s inception, the global market has become increasingly integrated.
Contemporary consumers and producers interact across borders. More
consumers consume both goods and services abroad. Thanks to
technological and telecommunication innovations, producers can now
optimize their production chains across multiple countries through global
supply chains. 139 Now, the main actors of international trade are not states,
but various individual economic players, such as suppliers, manufacturers
(from all different production stages), importers, distributors, wholesalers,
retailers, shippers, bankers, forwarders, insurers, and consumers. In this
“postnational constellation,” 140 trade relations are no longer defined in
statist, reciprocal, mercantilist, and thus confrontational terms that pit
domestic producers against foreign producers. 141 Instead, the center of
attention shifts from sovereign states to those individual economic players
who participate in and now drive the development of the international
trading community. As a result, a pure rationalist framework that focuses
134. March & Olsen, supra note 101, at 23.
135. PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 139 (1987).
136. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 37, at 67; see also Finnemore, supra note 16, at 325–26; March
& Olsen, supra note 101, at 184; Soltan, supra note 128, at 393.
137. See Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 527, 535 (2008)
(characterizing the WTO as a “constitutional” instrument that “seeks to protect the distribution of
expectations concerning the trade-related behavior of governments”).
138. Francis J. Mootz III, Natural Law and the Cultivation of Legal Rhetoric, in REDISCOVERING
FULLER, supra note 127, at 425, 442.
139. See supra note 43.
140. HABERMAS, supra note 44, at 172.
141. “Developments in the production, exchange, and/or use of private goods and nonspecific
assets will more and more be shaped and determined primarily by transnational or global factors and
trends.” Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 INT’L ORG. 595, 621
(1995).
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on the role of state actors in empire-building is becoming deficient in
understanding the development of the contemporary WTO.
Finally, a shift to the communitarian paradigm is necessary once it is
recognized that the rationalist approach ignores the disparity in
development amongst the members of the WTO community. If we
characterize the WTO as a community, such developmental disparity tends
to become increasingly intolerable, 142 as it generates communitarian risks
that threaten the smooth operation of the community. For example, when
poverty begets violence, such as pirates, civil wars, and terrorism, 143 the
WTO’s community suffers because there is often a corresponding
disruption of supply chains and subsequent loss of employment. The
recent global financial crisis has only aggravated the existing
developmental disparity. The world’s poor will suffer from the crisis long
after more developed countries recover from it. 144 Here, the new
(communitarian) paradigm can help WTO members gradually change their
way of thinking and generate new ideas and proposals to address these
long-unattended concerns. In sum, a new (Gemeinschaftian) paradigm for
the WTO can complement the old paradigm (rationalism), in that the
former can illuminate some of blind spots left by the latter and thus offer
the WTO a new pathway towards addressing some of its contemporary
issues.

III. APPLYING THE NEW FRAMEWORK TO THE WTO
A.

Institutional Evolution From Within

Under the rationalist framework, it is assumed that the WTO is an
embodiment of institutional “choices,” which are the product of a costbenefit analysis between institutional “alternatives,” such as the
“incorporation of international standards, judicial balancing, delegation to
markets, national deference, and process-based review.” 145 In contrast,
under the communitarian framework, the WTO is also a reflection of the
intersection of various emerging patterns of normative discourse within
the WTO that are influenced by historical developments and different
142. Sen, supra note 47, at 68.
143. See generally Sungjoon Cho, A New Agenda for Peace: International Trade Law as a Practical
Discourse, in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY?: CRITICAL, HISTORICAL
AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 63 (Padideh Ala’i et al eds., 2006) (warning that trade
marginalization and consequent international developmental difficulties (global poverty) tends to give
rise to conflicts).
144. Cho, supra note 121, at 35 (observing that the recent global financial crisis would wreak
havoc on poor countries, even though it originated from rich countries).
145. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 152.
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discursive conditions. 146 After all, why and how states formulate their
choices depend on how they define their interests and identities.
Because the WTO community develops over time, it should not be
viewed as a set of preprogrammed institutional choices informed by fixed
preferences, but as an evolving entity that stems from developing,
institutional discourse, such as various institutional rules and practices
(acquis communautaire). This recognition of a historical dimension of the
WTO critically distinguishes the new paradigm from the rationalist
approach. As discussed above, 147 one of the blind spots left by rationalism
is its lack of satisfactory explanation as to the real phenomenon of
institutional change. The sociological (constructivist) paradigm can address
such a deficiency, because it deals within cognitive parameters, such as
cultures, values, and discourse, that necessarily analyze changes in a
dynamic fashion. Thus, under the new paradigm, institutional change can
be explained because the WTO is viewed as being constantly subjected to
an evolutionary or adaptive process of continuous, incremental
institutional development that is premised upon WTO members’ reflection
of the past.
Not only would a sociological paradigm be useful for better
understanding institutional change generally, but it can also be used to
recognize the role of WTO committees in contributing to this evolution of
the WTO. Relying on the rationalist paradigm, Shaffer and Trachtman
consider WTO committees, such as the Antidumping Committee or the
Committee on Regional Trading Agreements, as preprogrammed, political
decision-making processes that aim to alleviate the adjudicative burdens of
WTO tribunals by elaborating on the textual meanings of certain
provisions. 148 Thus, WTO committees exist to reduce transaction costs
borne by WTO members in resolving disputes; they are designed to apply,
but not expand upon, preexisting institutional choices. Under the new
paradigm, however, these committees can be viewed to offer an “iterative
process” of “justificatory discourse.”149 Through continuing discourse
(peer reviews) in the committee discursive sphere, WTO members may
expand their shared normative values by expressing them in various legal
materials, such as guidelines or recommendations. In turn, these legal
materials encourage future discourse in the area of international trade
matters that they address, be it in antidumping, sanitary, or any other area
of regulation.

146. See supra text accompanying notes 135–42.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 89–90.
148. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 123–24.
149. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 25–27 (1995).
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Through the perspective of the sociological paradigm, the WTO’s
delegation of responsibility to other international organizations or
international standard-setting bodies may also be understood to be
motivated by reasons beyond mere economic welfare efficiency. 150 Such
delegation can be viewed instead as the WTO’s creation of crossinstitutional platforms that allow for “inter-discourse” between the WTO
and non-WTO regimes. These discursive platforms are explicitly
recognized in different international documents, such as in Articles 3.5 and
12.3 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement). Article 3.5 requires the SPS Committee to “develop a
procedure to monitor the process of international harmonization and
coordinate efforts in this regard with the relevant international
organizations.” 151 Article 12.3 also mandates the SPS Committee to
“maintain close contact with the relevant international organizations,” such
as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, in order to “secur[e] the best
available scientific and technical advice.” 152 Thus, not only is the WTO itself
influenced by discursive developments, but it also communicates with other
organizations to build a more extensive international dialogue based on
shared norms and values. The sociological framework, unlike the rationalist
one, recognizes these interplays and seeks to integrate them into the overall
understanding of the WTO.

B.

Adjudicative Discourse

The sociological paradigm is also able to bring additional explanatory
insight as to the condition of the judicial institutions and legal functions of
the WTO. According to Shaffer and Trachtman, rationalist paradigms
regard the extensive delegation of interpretive power to WTO tribunals as
a rational institutional choice, made during the initial stage of treaty
drafting and characterized by a generally ineffective decision-making
process dominated by consensus rule.153 However, contrary to this
rationalist viewpoint, the state of WTO tribunals is not static. There is an
endogenous sociological dynamic amongst WTO members, wherein they
engage in continuing discourse relating to the nature of WTO adjudication
(adjudicative discourse). Not only as disputing parties, but also as
interested parties, WTO members collectively contribute to the
adjudicative discourse and influence the jurisgenerative, or jurisprudential,
150. Cf. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 114.
151. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 3.5, 1867 U.N.T.S.
493 (1994).
152. Id. art. 12.3.
153. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 123–24.
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process through different modes of argumentation, persuasion, and
deliberation. Moreover, this adjudicative discourse does not take place only
to passively deduce predetermined texts, as rationalists may claim. Instead,
such discourse “seek[s to build] consistency that connects past, present,
and future”154 conditions of the WTO, not by blindly sticking to its
framers’ intentions, but by seeking the “exigencies of contemporary
life.” 155
In addition to its contribution in reframing the role of WTO tribunals,
the new paradigm sheds fresh light on the WTO tribunals’ various
interpretive choices. According to Shaffer and Trachtman and the
rationalist paradigm, even judicial interpretation is a matter of institutional
design (choice) in a welfare-maximizing contract. Therefore, the rationalist
scholar is only concerned about what kinds of norms have actually been
delegated to WTO tribunals to apply or impose in accordance with the
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. For example, according to
Shaffer and Trachtman, Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement is a
conscious choice by WTO members to “constrain treaty interpretation of
particular provisions by assigning particular interpretive rules to them.” 156
Under Article 17.6(ii), a panel must defer its interpretive power to a
domestic antidumping authority if the latter’s determination rests on one
of possible interpretations that the former may permit. Article 17.6(ii)
could arguably be seen as a method of constraint; for example, to the
United States, this article was a “Trojan horse” within the Antidumping
Agreement because it would safeguard U.S. sovereign authority in
regulating allegedly dumped imports. 157 However, the Appellate Body
rejected what would have been a rationalist interpretation of Article 17.6(ii)
by claiming that it held interpretive competence vis-à-vis WTO members.
This claim of power by the Appellate Body can best be understood under
the sociological framework; its decision largely drew on preceding
communications and advocacy from parties who were interested in
increasing the role of the WTO within the antidumping arena. 158
Another difference between rationalism and the new sociological
framework is how each paradigm perceives the WTO tribunals’ authority
(discretion) in applying non-WTO laws, such as multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs), in accordance with Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. On its face, Article 31.3(c) mandates
that WTO tribunals take into account any applicable, relevant non-WTO
154. THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 335 (1995).
155. JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 96 (2005)
(quoting Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the UN, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 17–18).
156. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 117.
157. Sungjoon Cho, Global Constitutional Lawmaking, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 621, 663–64 (2010).
158. Id. at 644–49.
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international law. 159 Therefore, from a rationalist standpoint, a WTO panel
must cite an MEA in a WTO dispute where both parties are also parties to
that MEA because Article 31.3(c) reflects a preprogrammed choice that
was designed to increase the efficiency or political welfare of the WTO.160
Therefore, this mandatory nexus between WTO norms and non-WTO
norms might be justified in welfarist terms. The utilization of non-WTO
norms may increase “welfare efficiency” in the WTO operation because
such utilization brings outside expertise to the WTO to solve its
problems. 161
The dilemma with interpreting the Article 31.3(c) mandate as only a
product of rational, institutional choice, as opposed to also being subjected
to normative discourse amongst the parties involved, is that it makes the
rationalist paradigm vulnerable to two main problems. First, merely
ratifying an MEA does not ensure the presence of adequate discourse or
shared grounds between parties concerned. More often than not,
developing countries ratify those agreements largely as a badge of honor,
without any serious discussion or due administrative and financial capacity
to implement them. Second, if one interprets Article 31.3(c) a contrario,
should a WTO tribunal not use an MEA in a dispute between a party and
a nonparty to the MEA? According to Shrimp-Turtle, an MEA may still be
referenced to evaluate the WTO behavior of an MEA-member party. 162
Such member’s normative behavior within the WTO context is thus
regulated by the MEA and then socially configured and reconfigured vis-àvis another member who is not a party to the MEA. 163 This process tends
to generate a new social dynamic made up of narratives, rhetoric, claims,
and arguments involving WTO norms as they relate to an MEA.
When the rationalist paradigm views the intersection between the WTO
and non-WTO organizations as simply a decision on the part of the WTO
to either apply (impose) non-WTO norms or not, it tends to overlook
more subtle, nuanced discursive possibilities of “inter-discourse” 164
between the WTO and non-WTO systems. This interdiscourse is not a
matter of any external imposition of norms in an authoritative or
159. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.3(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331(“There shall be taken into account, together with the context: . . . (c) any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”).
160. See supra text accompanying note 145.
161. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 134–35.
162. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 62.
163. The Appellate Body failed to fully capture the subtle discursive connection implicit under
Article 31.3(c) of the VCLT when it took a binary, choice-based approach in Mexico-Soft Drinks,
ruling that it might not “determine rights and duties outside the covered agreements.” Appellate Body
Report, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶ 56, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6,
2006) (emphasis added).
164. GOODRICH, supra note 135, at 146–51.
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hierarchical sense; instead, it should be viewed more as a nuanced frame of
reference in a cognitive sense. The strength of this discursive link between
the two systems depends on the extent of the range of shared cognitive
grounds between parties concerned, i.e., whether government officials
recognize a particular non-WTO norm in their everyday regulation or
administration of affairs and whether such norm is part of the practical
legal discourse amongst affected practitioners.
Importantly, certain legal technicalities, such as “judicial notice,” 165 may
shield those interlocutors’ exercise of cognitive (communicative) rationality
from a potential positivist attack under the WTO treaty. The WTO
community’s discursive sphere as defined in a strict jurisdictional term is
confined to the titular “covered agreements” under the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU). Specifically, a WTO member has no right under the
WTO treaty to sue another member for the latter’s violation of non-WTO
treaties, such as the International Monetary Fund Agreement or the
International Labor Organization Charter. Nor is a WTO panel
empowered to apply non-WTO norms in adjudicating WTO disputes
raised under covered agreements. Thus, the rationalist paradigm argues
that these limitations may be understood as rational constraints created by
sovereign WTO members who view non-WTO norms as irreconcilable
with the WTO’s original contractual terms, whose primary function is to
increase economic efficiency and trade liberalization. 166
From a sociological standpoint, however, the aforementioned
constraints on the application of non-WTO norms simply reflect the
current discursive conditions in which the WTO’s community is situated
as they relate to non-WTO norms. The current discourse merely signals
that, as of right now, there is an institutional boundary to the shared
grounds between the WTO and non-WTO legal systems. The so-called
“fragmentation” of international law is more of a natural (discursive) status
of international law than of a matter of institutional choice.
Thus, the moment we understand WTO norms as a language or a
communicative medium, we can liberate our discussion of WTO norms
from rationalist assumptions and move forward in the future development
of the WTO. To remain sustainable in the international political arena, the
WTO community must continue to communicate with its environment
and expand its discursive sphere (shared grounds) to non-WTO legal
systems. 167 Of course, this communication should begin with indirect,
165. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 201. (“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.”).
166. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 131–33.
167. See generally Sungjoon Cho, Toward an Identity Theory of International Organizations, 102 AM.
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osmotic processes (e.g., simply judicially noticing or taking into account
non-WTO laws), rather than in direct, concrete terms (e.g., applying nonWTO laws). Through these indirect processes, judicial notice, as an
objective assessment of facts within the meaning of the DSU, can be more
of a discursive platform, on the basis of which WTO tribunals may
recognize and utilize non-WTO norms in a cognitive sense. In that way,
WTO tribunals are able to take non-WTO norms into account, but do not
need to be confronted with a rationalist (binary) choice as to whether to
apply them in contravention to preexisting WTO constraints.
A word of caution should be added here, however. Even though WTO
tribunals do retain certain discretion to consult non-WTO norms, as
implied in EC — Biotech,168 such discretion should not be reduced merely
to individual judges’ preferences in a public choice model. According to
the new sociological paradigm, the inclusion of non-WTO norms should
be a discursive reflection of the culture, values, and norms of the
interpretive community within the WTO. 169 This discourse endeavors to
preserve a connection to its environment, including non-WTO legal
systems, by expanding the discursive sphere. Thus, through different
forms of discourse, including adjudication, various interlocutors (e.g.,
traders, trading nations, and the WTO tribunals) should expand their
cognitive boundaries to include non-WTO laws in order to produce better
arguments and decisions within the WTO system.

C.

Risk Regulation

Another normative dilemma that the rationalist approach cannot
reconcile is the debate between rationalists and culturalists as to the role of
risk regulation. 170 For example, the recent dogmatic disputes between the
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 157 (2008). Shaffer and Trachtman present a similar perspective in rationalist
terms. According to the authors, the WTO tribunal may opt to “accommodate conflicting
provisions” in non-WTO agreements, despite textual constraints, when it feels the need to protect
the WTO regime from certain challenges to its legitimacy or to mitigate the tensions that a contrary
decision would create as a result of the current fragmented state of the international law system.
Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 29.
168. Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, (Sep. 29, 2006). In this case, a WTO panel
struck down the EU’s moratorium on the approval of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for
procedural reasons (undue delay). Id. It also invalidated some members’ import bans on GMOs on
the ground that such a ban prevents members from conducting risk assessments, which may have
resulted in the allowance of certain GMOs, given the sufficiency of available, relevant scientific
information. Id. The panel ruled that Article 31(3)(c) should be interpreted to “mandate consideration
of other applicable rules of international law . . . which are applicable in the relations between all
parties to the treaty which is being interpreted.” Id. ¶ 7.70 (emphasis added).
169. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 29. (observing from a constructivist perspective that
social context may inform judicial interpretation).
170. Id. at 137.
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United States and Europe over the safety of hormone-treated beef and
genetically modified food raises questions as to the blind faith accorded to
the mainstream version of science, upon which rational paradigms often
rely to justify sanitary regulations. 171 The sociological framework would
instead turn to the study of philosophy, in particular that of hermeneutics,
to suggest that there is room for reconciliation between the two parties
through continuing dialogue and, subsequently, “a lessening of distance” 172
between the two conflicting perspectives.
To achieve this result, WTO members should fully utilize various
procedural mechanisms that are made available for regulatory dialogue
through major WTO agreements, such as the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). 173 For example, the SPS
Committee provides a special peer review procedure called “specific trade
concerns,” in which WTO members resolve controversial SPS issues
through discussions and consultations with each other. 174 Thus, members
can endeavor to resolve conceptual disagreements by exploiting the
multiple avenues that have been made available for such regulatory
dialogue. 175

D.

Development

The new sociological framework may also proffer prescriptive
responses to some of the normative dilemmas that the rationalist approach
is incapable of coping, due to its paradigmatic limitations. As discussed
above, rationalism neither recognizes nor offers a solution to the
developmental disparity amongst WTO members. 176 Under the new
sociological paradigm, such developmental disparity is treated as a serious
problem to the development of discursive spheres. All participants to the
development of the WTO discourse must be able to communicate
competently, since the WTO’s “jurisgenerative communicative power” can
only originate from “undamaged intersubjectivity found in nondistorted
communication.” 177
171. See generally Sungjoon Cho, Book Review, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 324 (2010) (reviewing MARK A.
POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2009)); Sungjoon Cho, From Control to
Communication: Science, Philosophy and World Trade Law, 44 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 249 (2011).
172. Axel Honneth, On the Destructive Power of the Third: Gadamer and Heidegger’s Doctrine of
Intersubjectivity, 29 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 5, 5 (2003).
173. See generally Sungjoon Cho, Of the World Trade Court’s Burden, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 675 (2009).
174. Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Review of the Operation and Implementation
of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/SPS/36 (Jul. 11, 2005).
175. Cho, supra note 173.
176. See supra text accompanying note 120.
177. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 147, 148 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996).
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Yet, many developing countries cannot effectively participate in the
WTO discourse transpiring in various spheres, such as in adjudication and
committee meetings, because they lack the financial and technical
capabilities to do so. As a result, these discursive spheres are deprived of
the “discourse ethics” 178 or “ideal speech situation” 179 that is a critical
prerequisite for any genuine discourse. Because the sociological framework
recognizes the danger of unbalanced representation in discursive spheres,
it also calls for international development organizations, such as the World
Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), NGOs, and individual developed countries to extend more
financial and technical assistance to those developing countries, in order to
foster more well-rounded, global communication.

E.

Paradigmatic Reconciliation: A Zone of Convergence

This Article contrasts the new sociological framework with the
rationalist approach advanced by Shaffer and Trachtman in their analysis
of the WTO based on institutional and interpretive choices. The Article
presents the former as a methodological response to certain dilemmas that
the latter inevitably ignores or cannot resolve. However, the fact that these
two paradigms arise from different sets of assumptions does not
necessarily disallow a zone of theoretical convergence between the two
frameworks. Even a market-based model of institutional understanding
may be amenable to a sociological approach. Likewise, markets may
expand the discursive sphere by inviting diverse economic — and social —
actors, such as traders, environmentalists, consumers, and regulators, to
engage in a constructive discourse on particular issues. 180
This zone of convergence can be seen, for example, in the issue of ecolabeling (such as the labeling of items as “dolphin-safe” or “GMO-free”).
Regulation of eco-labels may be interpreted to both promote free trade by
increasing certainty over labeled products and serve the cause of
environmental protection, which emerged from the discursive process of
consumer decision-making. 181 Admittedly, such convergence requires
certain conditions to be met, rendering it a special case. Eco-labeling
works only when no market failures, such as “information asymmetries,
externalities, and collective action problems,” 182 exist and consumers are
178. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION xix passim
(1990).
179. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, ON THE PRAGMATICS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION: PRELIMINARY
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 97 passim (Barbara Fultner trans., MIT
Press 2001).
180. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 146.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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well informed about the issue, meaning that they lack any cognitive errors,
such as the tendency to believe that they can predict the future based on
their own narrow experiences (availability heuristics). 183
The zone of convergence also appears when we examine the evaluative
criteria used by the rationalist paradigm in a sociological light. For
example, the economic efficiency that accompanies trade liberalization is a
key yardstick for rationalism. However, that same criterion may still be
satisfied within a sociological framework. In the so-called “ideal speech
situation,” market participants — including not only trading nations, but
also individual economic players — are assumed to be able to
communicate competently enough to hold socially meaningful discursive
exchanges that are guided by trade norms as they manufacture, transport,
insure, forward, export, import, distribute, retail, and consume. In this
ideal social situation, a socially well-integrated market is also likely to be
efficient in an economic sense. Jerry Muller aptly observes that:
In a commercial society based upon exchange, every man “becomes
in some measure a merchant.”. . . The pursuit of self-interest in the
market, with its division of labor and his resulting dependence on
others, leads him to adapt his behavior to the expectations of others. The
market itself is therefore a disciplining institution. 184
In sum, the paradigmatic convergence between the rationalist
(economic) and the sociological approach corresponds to a broad notion
of rationality. Rationality refers not only to being efficient in economic
terms (instrumental rationality), but also to being appropriate in a cognitive
and communicative sense. Thus, an extended concept of rationality can
embrace both the economic and the sociological framework.

CONCLUSION
This Article argued that the rationalist framework Shaffer and
Trachtman adopt in their analysis of the WTO cannot provide a complete
picture of the WTO because it excludes the WTO’s social dimension. In
response to this dilemma, the Article offered a sociological (constructivist)
paradigm that recognizes the existence of reflective, diverse
communication amongst WTO members that serves as a norm-building
process. Under this new paradigm, the WTO is viewed as a community
(Gemeinschaft) and not as a mere contractual tool to be used to carry out
predetermined choices.
183. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahnema, Judgments under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCI. 1124, 1124–31 (1974).
184. JERRY Z. MULLER, THE MIND AND THE MARKET: CAPITALISM IN MODERN EUROPEAN
THOUGHT 72 (2002) (emphasis added).
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This Article and the sociological framework that it presents can be used
to shed light on the current Doha crisis, which is suffering from
mercantilist competition concerns that may be justified on rationalist
grounds, but not on normative ones. 185 Pursuing “rational” bargains may
not deliver us to the goal of a development round. Perhaps we should
reorient ourselves from a logic of calculation to the logic of discourse. The
power of discourse and communication can close the gaps between trade
norms and trade realities. Therefore, the new paradigm may disabuse
WTO constituencies of a fatalistic yet erroneous conviction that “legal
provisions can be nothing other than reflections of unstable and shifting
interest constellations among powers” 186 and help reinstate the
“inspirational notions of virtue and of humans as social beings.” 187 In this
sense, the new paradigm proposed in this Article may generate a “moral”
thesis that advocates human progress in the WTO. 188

See supra text accompanying note 124.
HABERMAS, supra note 44, at 167.
Spence & Cross, supra note 50, at 103.
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